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I finished up in the Whitlam Government as PPS to the PM.  On the Dismissal I 
decided to go back to Sydney and return to the law.   
 
I got a phone call Hugh Hudson from SA asking if I would come and work in his 
office as a planning advisor.  I had met Hugh a couple times in relation to his 
education projects seeking the PM’s interest.  We had got on well.  
 
Up to that time I had had a fairly mixed career.  You couldn’t really call it a career 
as I had just done what had come up.  As a result of a teenage illness it was 
expected that I might not survive beyond the age of 50.  Accordingly I decided to 
just do what came around rather than settle down to being a Sydney solicitor. 
 
My interest in urban affairs stemmed from my Uni days.  I had a number of 
friends and later some clients who were architects.  I was enthused about 
heritage and urban design issues, especially because of the early fights to save 
historic houses led by people like Leo Schofield. Also at this time I was a director 
of the Australian Institute of Political Science and played a major role in the 
organization on summer schools, Australian Cities and How Many Australians? 
 
One of my close school friends suggested he and I should attend the part time 
town planning course at Sydney University so we started the post grad course in 
1966.  At this time I was also concerned about the way in which the Housing 
Commission was creating large scale housing estates which I thought were going 
to be socially deprived enclaves.  I wrote a couple of short articles about it and 
was surprised by the strength of the Commission’s attack on us.  Middle class 
critics that had no interest in the working class was the typical approach.  
 
I also wrote a chapter on urban design in a book by Robyn Boyd and others. In it 
I criticized the role subdivision control had on urban design – ‘the tyranny of the 
lot boundary’. 
 
Anticipating a Labor victory in 1972 in late 1969 I threw in my partnership in my 
father’s firm and took my young family to Canberra where I joined the NCDC as a 
class three town planner.  I think I was employed as insurance for the 
organization because I had been assisting Tom Uren with some of his urban 
speeches.  Also a lawyer who also was a TP was unusual.  
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On the Labor victory I was seconded to Uren as his Senior Advisor – one of the 
first of the new advisor positions.  
 
During my time in Uren’s office, in DURD as an Assistant Secretary and back in 
NCDC, my views on urban issues were further formed.  I was especially 
influenced by: 
 
 The work I did in reviewing the Design Controls for Detached Houses in 
Canberra.   With a couple of Victorian architects we laboured to get better 
urban design in suburban Canberra only to be defeated by the way the 
planning and administrative system as a whole operated.  It was here that 
I began to realize that ‘form follows organisation’. The best we could do 
was to at least write the controls with reasonably meaningful objectives 
and standards, which I think was a first.  I also managed to have sites for 
medium density (unsubdivided sites) released for sale with broad urban 
design objectives and only a minimum of controls over density and height 
and none over detailed design.  There was a bonus if the design was 
judged to be excellent.  
 The realization that there was nobody in the NCDC apart from the 
Commissioner himself who could take responsibility for the end product 
of our efforts.  The Commission was the ultimate silo organization where 
there were a large number of experts each of whom had carriage of a 
particular standard. One view of the design of suburban Canberra is to see 
it as the sum total of those standards.  With a silo organization it is not 
possible to have clear responsibility for outcomes, such as how a new 
suburb looks and operates. 
 The insistence by Pat Troy not to have anything to do with the NURDA, 
later the Cities Commission as the basis for his new department, DURD.  
He did not want a planner/engineer dominated organization but rather 
wanted to employ a wide range of skills and talent.  For this he needed the 
administrative grades not the professional grades, entry into which 
depend on particular qualifications.  He put together a truly outstanding 
group of people.  
 The urban forecasting work of Bunker and Wilmoth, which, for the first 
time, really got to grips with the household formation patterns, economic 
trends and area predictions.  
 The concept of urban management inherent in some of DURD’s work, 
especially the potential, seldom achieved, of the roles of the regional 
managers of the Area Improvement Program.  
 From a policy point of view during this time I fought against large scale or 
distinct public housing projects. So I opposed, both unsuccessfully, the 
Woolloomooloo project and the concrete manufactured housing project in 
Belconnen, ACT.  Concerned about the excessive support given by the tax 
system to home ownership, I fought semi successfully against Senator 
Geitzel’s proposal to make housing interest rates tax deductable and 
sponsored a detailed look at all aspects of Canberra’s housing policies.   
 While in Canberra I helped to sponsor a cooperative housing scheme for 
purchasers, which totally threw away the standard controls of the 
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Commission and created a design designed for the site – the Kanbah Co-
op - one of the few contextual residential designs in Canberra. 
 
Re the new town projects, I was opposed to the Cities Commission’s list of 
proposals.  These had been the result of nominations provided by each State 
under the previous government.  The only ones I supported were Albury 
Wodonga and Campbelltown, the latter because it was really just an extension of 
Sydney.  Wanting the government to concentrate on the outer suburbs issues, I 
did my best to derail the new cities program.  Uren didn’t necessarily disagree 




 Uren’s sense of humour saw me appointed as the CW representative on the 
Monarto Board.   
 
My only connection with SA had been in the early days of the Government when I 
deputized for the Minister at a talk given to a dinner in St Peters.  It was an odd 
occasion but very civilized.  Wives etc waited on a large table of males and at the 
end of an excellent meal I was asked to address a number of urban issues.  
Included was where I thought the new town for SA would be and I answered 
‘Albury Wodonga’. Next day back in Canberra I was rung by a very threatening 
person called Peter Ward to impress on me how vital the new town project was 
to the Dunstan government.  
 
My several trips to Adelaide for Board meetings were instructive.    I was 
disappointed that the structure of the Monarto Commission was an NCDC style 
with silos but it had a good, if excessive, number of staff.  I kept calling for more 
population studies because Wilmoth’s work was showing that the demand was 
just not there.  The excessive money Uren had got out of Cabinet for funding the 
new towns projects saw a fair amount going to Monarto, given Dunstan’s quick 
cooperation compared to the other conservative Premiers. After paying for a 
generous land acquisition program, I ensured other funds got spent on tree 
planting thus avoiding the commencement of the sewerage system, which would 
have locked in what I considered to be a project which, at that stage anyway, 
looked as if it would not be needed or be viable.  
 
Ward and others constantly reminded me that the project was critical to 
Dunstan’s electoral success.  I have since come to suspect that the genesis of the 
location had to do with putting Labor voters in the seat of Murray Bridge.  
 
Ministerial Advisor  
 
I started as Hudson’s ministerial advisor in early 1976.  We were in an office in 
Greenhill Road.  Hudson was also Minister for the Housing Trust and the Land 
Commission and Monarto?  An intelligent man he was an excellent Minister. He 
loved an argument and would always think about the issue and often came back 
to you in agreement.  Hudson was a strong supporter of Monarto, having had, I 
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think, a hand in its adoption.  This may have been because he was a numbers 
man for the Party.  
 
My task was to review the planning system and give consideration to housing 
policy.  I had a couple of discussions with Dunstan who I knew from my time 
with Whitlam.  He was unhappy about the SPA and the lack of action on a range 
of urban design issues. I think Peter Ward had a strong influence on some of 
these issues, especially the City ones.  Because of the Monarto connection I saw 
quite a bit of Ward who I liked and respected and with whom I had some 
interesting discussions and arguments.  Peter’s views, like Dunstan’s were 
influenced by concerns about symptoms.  He also, like most of us, was concerned 
about particular issues outside the front door – Hurtle Square in the City in his 
case. Dunstan (and Ward) was critical of the quality of the arterials with strip 
development, outdoor advertising, stobie poles and little landscaping.  He was 
also very concerned about the loss of agricultural land in McLaren Vale, the Hills 
and the Barossa.  He was suspicious of the way development was controlled and 
concerned about the quality of development and the architecture.  
 
Dunstan had a shopping list of issues, but, like many people concerned with 
urban issues, he addressed symptoms.  The underlying causes were not 
analyzed, although he did identify the government structures, managers and 
processes as somehow the causes of the problems.  
 
I went around discussing issues with heads of departments, architects, Stretton, 
Platern, etc. It wasn’t a very structured review, but I did write a short report for 
internal use.   
 
In keeping with my interest in urban management I got two young social 
planners from Monarto to do an assessment of an area of new development area 
at Hallet Cove in southern Adelaide.  I wanted a post development assessment.   
 
It was damming.  Despite all being controlled by the planning system, the final 
product was poor.  Bits of centre on both sides of the railway.  Gaps, 
opportunities lost.  Social development non-existing.  The statutory planners 
could not see anything was wrong. All the bits internally complied with the 
controls.  It is just that they didn’t fit together.  It was typical of the products of a 
typical statutory planning system.   And, of course, as with Canberra, nobody 
could be held to be accountable for the outcome.  
 
Sacking the Police Commissioner 
 
While we were at Greenhill Road I recall Hudson returning from a Cabinet 
meeting pulling me into his office and closing the door.  ‘We have just sacked the 
Police Commissioner’ he said.  I said, ‘You are all dead’.   
 
Given my experiences with Uren and Whitlam, the latter especially in the last few 
weeks of the Government, I was conscious just how much Labor Governments 
must not threaten the security services if they are to survive.     
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My Approach to Urban Policy 
 
It was a time when all reformist governments were putting ministers in charge of 
what had been till then powerful State commissions – public works, land and 
water managers.   Power was being redirected to Cabinet with a view to 
Ministers becoming more managerial.  
 
I had formed the view that the problem for Town Planning organizations and the 
Planning profession was that they essentially influenced the end of a production 
process – separating land uses and exercising development control over design.  
They were not structured or qualified to understand and influence the drivers of 
urban development – the urban economics, the institutional imperatives, the 
nature of the legislation and the politics.  Planners are essentially colour 
consultants. 
 
My proposal to the Minister and Dunstan was that planning should become a 
Ministerial Department rather than be a statutory body.  It should operate with 
much more influence in Cabinet and manage the cities and regions rather than 
just control development by administering the planning legislation.  The fact that 
between the new Land Commission, the Housing Trust and Monarto, for which 
the Minister was responsible, the State owning a large slice of the further urban 
land, meant that the government potentially had a major set of levers to manage 
development positively not just wait for proposals, although I would have taken 
an urban management direction even if the public land holdings were not so 
influential.  
 
We worked out how the change could take place without going to Parliament, 
which may not have supported it.  The SPA continued, along with the statutory 
position of Director of Planning.  It is just that, by Administrative Arrangements 
Order, the staff that had been made available to the DoP came over to the new 
DG of the Department.  
 
City of Adelaide 
 
One of the jobs I was given in mid-1976 was to legislate the George Clarke City 
Plan.  This was a comprehensive document with over 90 policies.  The planning 
exercise was a typical and successful example of SA corporate togetherness.  The 
Labor Government, the interested academics and professionals and the City 
business establishment combined to take control of the City from the Council 
engineer and rethink the future of the City.   
 
The Clarke Plan, while excellent in many respects was  the subject of an IDC that 
didn’t seem to be going anywhere with powerful Ministers such as Transport 
and Roads opposing the strategic policies that affected State programs and Labor 
electorates with things such as a by-pass freeway.  
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It was clear that I would not get Cabinet approval to ‘legislate for the plan’.  This 
did not concern me as I had the view by then that planning and managing are 
administrative activities with controlling development being merely a tool of 
urban management.  In a sovereign government such as a State, only 
development control needs legislation.  What does it mean to legislate policies 
that have direct implications for budget expenditures? 
 
As the IDO controlling development was ending at the end of 1976 and the Upper 
House had said it would not be renewed, legislation was urgent.  I proposed to 
the City Planner and the Parliamentary Counsel that we should only legislate for 
development control.  This became the City of Adelaide (Development Control) Act 
1976.  The City  Planner (Michael Llewellyn-Smith) and I sat in his garden over 
one weekend and took out of George’s plan all the policies that affected property 
rights.  These became the ‘Principle of Development Control’, a title dreamt up by 
PC, and it was these that were given the force of legislation.   
 
Building on a technique from San Francisco, George had adopted a place or 
locality format for writing controls with well worded Desired Future Character 
Statements for each of the 80 or so places in the City and North Adelaide.   
 
We retained the successful City of Adelaide Development Committee, the four by 
four city/state committee that had overseen the City Plan and exercised interim 
development control.  As control was now to be exercised by council, I gave the 
CADC an exception role for applications that exceeded the controls and for State 
and council developments.  The CADC was the model for the SA Development 
Assessment Commission in the 1983 Development Act, which was greatly 
influenced by (if unnecessarily more complex than) the 1976 City legislation.  
 
In the end, we finished up in the City with what became a model, I still think 
should be a model, for the rest of Australia – very simple legislation where 
everything is subject to consent and there is a multifaceted strategic plan for the 
City with legislated development controls formatted largely on a place basis.  
Indeed, if I had had a choice, I would have integrated the land use zone controls 
into the place formats.   
 
And, in the City, because of an accident of history, there was no control over 
subdivision, which is not necessary if you control use and structures.  Without 
subdivision control you can liberate designers and make it possible to get a 
better cash flow with medium density housing. (Unfortunately, some years later, 
some tidy minded planner decided to make the City planning consistent with the 
State. Subdivision control was imposed in the City, instead of it being abolished 
in the State.) 
 
With typical SA corporate cooperation the Bill passed the Parliament in time and 
only suffered from one major fault – the inability to impose IDO while changing 
controls.  (This mattered later in the eighties when the City tried to down zone 
some sites leading to a rush to over build in a boom, which exacerbated the 
collapse.) 
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The next five years saw an excellent relationship between the City and the State.  
With senior public servants on the CADC, with the Lord Mayor as chair, my area 
manager with his office next to the City Planner’s and on good terms with the LM 
and my friendship with the City Planner, almost all issues were solved before 
they became problems.  It was an excellent example of what has been called a 
marble cake version of intergovernmental relationships – having the right 
arrangements to enable the right mix of powers to meet whatever is the issue – 
rather than the layer cake version dependent of the clear division of powers so 
liked by the constitutional lawyers.  This was the model for the way I wanted to 
manage the planning issues in the rest of the State using Area Managers who job 
was to get on-side with their local councils to foster cooperation rather than the 
excessive State/local friction that had existed.  
 
 
Head of Department  
 
Dunstan and Hudson wanted me to head the new Department and I agreed.  It 
meant being put over the head of Stuart Hart the public servant who was also 
chair of the SPA, a statutory authority.  As a public servant he headed a State 
Planning Office, then a division of the Premiers Department.  Dunstan created a 
new Department of Housing and Urban Affairs and put the staff of the Office in 
that with me as its DG.   
 
An early issue I had to deal with was the quite natural anger of Stuart and others 
about the change.  I had to point out that the staff of the Office were mine and 
that I would continue to provide assistance to the SPA in its statutory duties but, 
in the end, I would organize and direct staff rather than Stuart (he did have some 
support staff for whom he was directly responsible).  He could complain to 
Parliament in his annual report if the Authority lacked resources.  I found the 
continuing existence of the SPA and DoP useful as they provided statutory bodies 
able to make development control decisions at ‘arms length’ from the Minister.  
This was essential if the Area Managers were going to be working in a proactive 
manner at the local level.  They could not be seen to be also managing the 
assessment decision making.  In the end the bodies morphed into the 
Development Assessment Commission, a model copied by NSW and being looked 
at by others.   
 
Designing an Urban Management Department 
 
Given my views on urban management and the experience of DURD, I was 
determined to change the silo department consisting of separate divisions of 
planners, planning technical officers and admin officers into a multi-disciplined 
urban and rural management department. I held the view that people behave as 
the organization requires them to behave and that therefore structure matters.  
(Now apparently known as the public choice theory)  You cannot get the policy 
implemented unless there are people whose job it is to deliver.  You cannot get 
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new policy unless the organizations encourage their adoption by being 
structured to be unthreatened by policy change.  
 
I needed new skills if we were to address the underlying drivers that created the 
outcomes Dunstan complained of.  
 
The organizational change was substantial and deep.  Essentially it led to all the 
professional planning positions and the technical positions being changed to 
administrative positions.   This enabled a wider range of skills to be employed.  It 
provided the opportunity to shift staff to new positions that did not have to have 
job descriptions that demanded a particular qualification.   
 
The resulting structure was based on to a series of area teams in a very flat 
structure, with a Regional Manager for the Metro and one for the Country.  The 
teams consisted of Area Managers for each of the areas into which we divided 
the State – five in the City and more in the country – equivalent to the regional 
planning areas.  These positions were what I have now called ‘outcome’ officers. 
The roles of the Area Managers were to do whatever it took to achieve the 
outcomes for the area.  They were to get onside with the local councils and work 
with them in a partnership manner to achieve the government’s objectives for 
the area. (This period has been extensively described by Alan Fogg in Process, 
Procedures & Plans AIUS 1980.) 
 
The levels in the hierarchy were reduced from around 12 to five/six.  The 
changes caused considerable resentment amongst some of the existing staff, 
especially some status conscious planning professionals, despite very great 
efforts at staff consultation and development over an 18 month period.  There 
was some resentment of the ‘Canberra imports’, most of whom were already 
working in SA and were not imported by me. 
 
There was no intention to get rid of anyone and a real effort was made to find 
places where everyone could find useful work.  The design of the new structure 
gave me considerable flexibility in shifting staff to where they and I felt they 
could do best. The flat structure and clear outcomes based positions resulted in 
significant increases in productivity, which was necessary because we were 
involving ourselves in many issues that had not usually been the province of 
planners.  
 
I was especially concerned to break the barriers that constrained the non-
professional staff from having a career path and worthwhile jobs.  I was 
concerned about this because of the example of the most experienced planner in 
the NCDC being unable to get promotion because he only had a technical diploma 
and not a degree.  The SA Department had many keen technical officers who, 
because of the new digital technology would find their jobs becoming redundant.  
They needed new career possibilities.  There was also the general admin staff 
who could do better jobs.  For example, an early action was to disband the 
stultifying and inefficient typing pool and distributed them amongst the new 
geographic teams as support staff.  Many took on new lease of life. 
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During this time I was well supported by the Minister and the staff in Dunstan’s 
office.  Ward and Dempsey (Dunstan’s Executive Assistant, who took over from 
Peter Ward when Ward resigned) were especially helpful with both passing on 
what they thought were Don’s main concerns.  Bakewell I also got on well with 
and he offered advice  and caution on how what we were trying to do fitted into 
the wider objectives of the government.   Like Guerin after him, I found Bakewell 
a bit sphinx- like in his utterances.  
 
Strategic Planning  
 
At the time of my review the strategic planning division of DoP’s office had 
started a review of the cadastral land use-zoning map that was the strategic plan 
of Adelaide.  (I realized how wrong it was for the statutory zoning map to be the 
strategic plan of a city when, early on in my role, the Deputy DoP asked me to 
approve the official statutory plan of Metro Adelaide which laboriously had been 
put together from all the council zoning maps.  The Greenhill offices were show 
as zoned ‘residential’, but virtually the whole street was offices.  It was explained 
that, in the written controls, offices were a ‘consent use’.) 
 
I was considered the updating the Metro plan was premature.   
 
The typical planning exercise projects forward a population a certain number of 
years, turned that into households, calculated the land required to house that 
increase and produced a zoning map accordingly.  
 
I thought this premature because the DURD projections identified a dramatic 
slowing in new household numbers in Adelaide – a housing demand of 12,000 
dropping to 6,000 over a short period.  I was also concerned about the viability 
of the SA industrial economy as Australia moved towards the abolition of tariff 
protection.  We did some modeling on this and, whichever way you looked at it 
the future was not great for the SA economy.  Given this, there was more than 
enough land identified as future urban in the existing Metro Plan.  Publishing a 
new outer urban boundary would encourage speculation and a decline in rural 
land use and encourage wasteful public works programs.  
 
It was said that a new plan was needed because the service providers demanding 
that they needed to plan their long term works program.  I became aware that 
bodies such as the EWS had large day labour forces and their population 
projections tended to those that supported the continuation of their public 
works program.  Budgets seemed to be based on last years plus expenditure, 
rather than demand.  I did not want the planners to produce a new zoning plan 
that identified land for development before it was needed and gave everyone a 
false view of the future.  I rightly suspected that when one analysed the need for 
certainty it did not need a zoning map and timing into the next 30 years.  When 
one really worked out the information needs of the agencies they would turn out 
to be a lot less.   
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Accordingly, the first thing I did on becoming DG was to stop the strategic 
planning work and replace it with work that after a couple of years produced 
what was known as the Staging Study.  This work was the first of the 
development forecasting work that since has become one of the techniques of 
most planning bodies.  
 
That brilliant urban economist and policy person, John Collins, had a small team 
of demographers and economists who went around and discussed population 
projections and capital works programs with most of the agencies.  The 
centralized subdivision control system operated by the Department provided an 
excellent cadastral database and a lot prediction process. Eventually the work 
was written up as the Staging Study, a simple unglossy typed document with 
strategic choices for constrained or expansive futures. There was no new zoning 
map but rather a large number of urban management actions that needed to be 
managed if the more constrained future was to be achieved.  Much of this work 
was already in hand through the regional teams and in changes to housing 
policy, etc.  We would get the teams together every few months, review what had 
been happening and work out the general strategic objectives and actions for the 
next period.  The results of these planning workshops provided the Area 
Managers with their work programs.  
 
We did not produce a glossy planning document and make a public performance 
out of the work because the news was bad, given the traditional ‘develop SA’ 
political rhetoric.  We were criticised as not doing any strategic planning work, 
when I would argue that we did far more effective planning and managing work 
than most planning agencies.  
 
The general strategic approach was to encourage a densification of the existing 
extensive urban area, stop using the poorer families as fringe development 
cannon fodder, create new second home development areas, save the Southern 
Vales from urbanization, a key Dunstan concern, by treating the Onkaparinga 
River as the southern boundary, with development being north if anywhere.  We, 
perhaps wrongly, wanted to get rid of the freeway reservation that was causing 
blight in the western suburbs and was an invitation to continue the southern 
sprawl into the Southern Vales. 
 
As a consequence of this work the agencies made substantial adjustments to 
their programs achieving substantial efficiencies.  This was done in a cooperative 
manner and, generally, was not seen as the planners telling agencies what to do. 
Certainly there was agreement on common and more realistic population 
projections. 
 
Land Price Control 
 
An early policy change Collins pushed for was the abolition of the land price 
control system.  We showed that if anything it was sustaining prices given the 
lack of demand and the oversupply. By the time it was abolished, if it had ever 
done anything, it had outlived its excuse for existence. 
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Naturally the operators of the system argued for its retention but with Hudson’s 
support, Cabinet went along with it.  There were no price consequences.  
 
This policy change was, I suppose, an example of what Stretton called ‘Canberra 
economists’ thought.  Certainly we were economic rationalists (rather than 
‘economic irrationalists’?), nowhere as extreme as say John Patterson (who was 
then I think heading the Hunter Water Board) became, but our rationalism was 
heavily affected by welfare concerns.  In other words, we were concerned with 
policies that had negative welfare consequences.  
 
Housing Policy  
 
The Minister and Dunstan wanted change in the SA Housing Trust but they did 
not want to upset Alec Ramsay.  Dunstan wanted better design – but I was 
concerned about leading the push for better medium density residential design 
using Trust housing.  This approach tends to give architect designed medium 
density a poor market image and tenants do not like to be stigmatized by good 
residential design that is unlike commercial housing.   
 
I was more concerned with the declining state of the SA industrial economy and 
the disappearance of the worker/manufacturing plant basis for Elizabeth etc – 
the original basis for the large fringe developments.  I was also especially 
concerned about the Trust’s development of the southern suburbs, given a view 
that the future was to the north, rather than the south – for reasons of 
economics, social policy and the protection of the Southern Vales.  
 
The new department had for the first time in any State government a really good 
team of welfare economists, including Greg Smith who recently was one of the 
Henry Review Commissioners (2010).  Traditionally, housing in State 
governments meant the Housing Commissions whose policy was whatever 
supported what they were doing and what they were doing was what they 
organized to do and what they were organized to do was spend the money from 
the C/W.  Ours was the first independent housing policy unit, apart from those 
who intervened occasionally at the margin from Treasury. While the staff were 
pretty left wing in social beliefs, there was a fair bit of what is now labeled 
economic rationalist thought.  We brainstormed a list of fundamental changes in 
policy we wanted to achieve.  Partly they were influenced by planning policy for 
Adelaide and partly by equity and efficiency concerns.  
 
Essentially the changes were directing at ridding the system of the ties between 
assistance to lower income householder for housing and the building of new 
houses.  The great influence the building industry everywhere has had on 
housing policy had seen in SA, especially, the situation where almost all 
assistance was tied to the production of a new house.  Both the housing industry 
and the social structure of Adelaide were seriously distorted.   
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Most of the fringe growth of the City was by subsidized housing, both owned and 
rented.  It was obvious that, increasingly, those housed in public rental housing 
would be unemployed, often single mothers.  The inner and middle suburbs were 
emptying with schools declining.  Existing houses were cheaper than new ones 
but you could get a subsidized loan.   
 
The whole development pattern had to change.  It should no longer be based on 
bribing the less well off to live on the fringe where living was most expensive and 
services least.   
 
The policy changes implemented included: 
 
 Change the CW/State Housing Agreement (in 1978) to drop the 
requirement that rents be charged on the basis of the cost of the house 
being rented. This crude cost-rent policy excused the construction of 
housing on the cheapest land – i.e. where others did not want to live.  It 
gave the Trust the excuse to not build on the small parcels of land it had 
in the inner and middle ring suburbs, or to buy existing housing.  The 
new Housing Agreement for the first time treated the housing authorities 
as businesses rather than public works organizations, with new C/W 
money being treated as a capital contribution, rather than funds at a 
certain rate of interest to construct certain new houses, the rents of 
which were to return the cost of that house over the lifetime of the loan.  
With the tie between the rent and the cost of the actual house being 
broken, the stock could be traded with the Agreement requiring that any 
funds had to be reinvested.   
 Stop the Trust from building any more housing tracts on the fringe.  This 
could happen because the cost based pricing had ended.  
 Encourage the Trust to change from being a housing construction 
organization to a housing manager directing more attention to the 
existing estates.  To this end, we analyzed the Trust’s accounts 
reformulating them from a cash based to an asset based format.  In 
keeping with the new Housing Agreement we encouraged the Trust to 
sell underperforming assets and trade in stock.  Also to stop building 
stock that couldn’t be subdivided and sold because it had no separate 
connections.  
 Buying rather than building houses, especially for special needs 
households.  The Emergency Housing unit was run out of the Department 
for a while.  I wanted to see it back in the Trust as a normal program 
rather than an exception to always build rather than buy approach.  
 Reduce the almost 100% tie of subsidized loans from the State Bank to 
the building of a new house and so allow more purchasers to buy any 
type of house, preferably in existing suburbs where some stock was 
cheaper than a new house and much better located from the point of 
view of existing services and public transport.  This was achieved by 
encouraging (by threatening to raise the interest rates which were 
extremely low in a time of very high rates) existing loan holders to repay 
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their small balances thus increasing the money available for loan and 
progressively reducing the tie.  
 
Most were achieved but with some hostility, particularly from the Trust Board, 
which thought we were ‘empire building’ and bullying a SA icon organization. 
Gilbert Seaman at the State Bank on the other hand was very pleased with our 
initiatives, which substantially increased the volume of lending. 
 
Dunstan did not seem to have a problem with tackling the Trust and getting it to 
accept the changed circumstance of public housing financing.  Hudson, although 
a Keynesian economist in the main, generally supported our tougher economic 
approach to housing policy. 
 
Alex Ramsay’s death touched us all.   Alex had been extremely good to me, 
spending long hours discussing issues.  I particularly learned the lesson, when 
proposing some particularly potentially unpopular policy change, Alex pulling 
out a bit of paper and saying, ‘Yes, well lets just write the Minister’s press 
statement.’  
 
Hudson and I at that time had been putting a fair bit of pressure on Alex, 
especially about his budget proposals.  I realized later that his Board was very 
unhappy with us.  Hugh had been urging him to retire, not because we were 
unhappy with him, but we were concerned about his health.  He, I suspect, did 
not want to do so until our threats were resolved. 
 
I became aware that a number of people who loved Alex (as I did) saw me as 
being at fault.  Indeed one Board member said she hated me at the time, although 
some years later, she realized that what I was trying to do with the Trust was 
right.   
 
The Staging Study 
 
The Staging Study, of which I have a copy, set out a preferred direction for the 
future of Adelaide.  In the place of continued Trust and low cost first home buyer 
sale housing to the south and up the Main North Road, we encouraged second 
home buyer developments, especially Golden Grove.  With the low cost loan tie 
to new houses being reduced, it was expected first home buyers, of which there 
would be less demographically every year in the 1980s, would buy existing 
houses, thereby helping to populate emptying suburbs and schools.  Hopefully, 
second home buyers would pick up some of the slack, although demography 
ensured that whatever policy was adopted, a housing industry downturn was 
inevitable.  
 
Being on the Land Commission Board, I pushed for the LC to stop producing 
blocks on the northern plains and to bring Golden Grove and other more up-
market, second homebuyer sites into production as soon as possible.  
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Over a long period John Collins and I had been trying to dispose of the Monarto 
project.  The staff had long been incorporated into the Department.  Those 
around Don, including Hudson and Ward, were very protective of the topic and 
always emphasized its continuing importance.  (Hugh and I had some great rows 
over it, including one in front of a very British planner from Milton Keynes.  I 
suspect he had a new view about colonial ministerial/DG relationships after that 
robust exchange.) 
 
Finally, with the aid of Dempsey, we managed to arrange a presentation of the 
Staging Study work to Don, and the big three ministers, Corcoran, Virgo and 
Hudson.  John had a big map of Adelaide that did not include Monarto and he 
started to go through the demographic and housing industry projections.  
Dunstan used to sit in these meetings with his eyes closed and one was not sure 
if he was listening. When John pointed out that housing starts dropped from 12 
to 6,000 over the next few years, Don opened his eyes and said ‘Is that right, 
Hugh?’  Hudson said it was and Don said, ‘Well that’s the end of Monarto then.’  
And without further discussion we went on with the rest of the presentation.  
 
Urban Design  
 
Dunstan and Ward were most concerned about the quality of design.  So was I.  
 
Thing was, what to do about it? 
 
The planning development control system was not driven by urban design 
objectives.  It was the standard zoning system with a cadastral plan separating 
land uses into detached house, medium density and high density zones and the 
usual retail commercial, industrial uses.   There were standard subdivision 
controls and requirements.  The arterials were generally zoned for a mixed-use 
strip development.   
 
The important design requirements were set back and height controls for each 
zone and, importantly, substantial car parking on site requirements.  Also an 
excessive requirement for 12.5 % open space in a subdivision.  (Apparently 
when the Planning Bill was going through the Upper House the usual 10% rule 
applied.  Someone late at night moved 15% and 12.5% became the compromise.  
Thus are planning standards made.) 
 
The Office of Planning was intent on implementing the Model Country Zoning 
Regulations on all the country towns.  These 50+ pages of detailed controls 
would have zoned the towns and imposed standard design controls on them all.  
Amongst other things they would have in time destroyed all the historic and 
often unique main streets as the requirement to have large car parks in front of 
retail premises was implemented.  Disaster. 
 
(During one of my several conversations with Stuart Hart about what he wanted 
to do given my being put in charge – we agreed on his conducting a review of the 
development control system – I asked him when would he know when he had 
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achieved his objectives and he replied, ‘When the Model Country Zoning 
Regulations have be made across the State’.  I realized that I really was not a 
statutory planner.)   
 
Building on the City’s urban design lead I was determined not to go down this 
standard and destructive traditional planner’s path.  I spoke to Dunstan about it 
at one of the lunches he and I had every six months or so.  He strongly supported 
an urban design approach.   
 
I had already employed as consultants an excellent couple of young architect 
planners to do a collaborative urban design/heritage study of Robe.  They had 
produced a simple set of City like place-formatted controls, which the local 
council and community supported.  The beauty of the DFC approach is that the 
community can have a meaningful role in setting realistic and meaningful 
objectives.  Burra provided the next opportunity, this time using departmental, 
ex Monarto, staff.  A great success and strongly supported by the locals.  The Area 
Manager in Norwood was conducting a similar exercise.  
 
This began the long process of preparing desired future character statements for 
all the important and threatened country towns.  I wanted the locals to value the 
whole place, not just isolated items or parts.  This was especially necessary given 
the different histories and settlement patterns in a number of towns.  
 
A standard ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach would have been a disaster, as it already 
had been in the Metro area.   
 
With a useful architect, Hank Den Ouden, from the Monarto team we prepared a 
series of design guides.  I remember our concern when he was unable to find 
more than a couple of examples of good architecture on the coasts and river 
frontages.  Unfortunately we probably did not publicise the guides sufficiently, 
but they may have had some effect. Certainly, their effect on local shopping 
centre design was substantial, with almost all applications producing something 
that looked just like the sketches in the guide.  
 
Up till then the traditional approach of planning to areas of special significance 
was to impose special zoning controls that required ‘good design’ and the 
exercise of design discretions by the controllers rather than merely checking lot 
sizes and set backs.    
 
The Hills Face zone was a classic example of special design controls.  We worked 
with the officers controlling the developments in the zone and produced and 
published a clear set of design standards and controls, which has served as an 
example for more general use.  
 
I took the view, and still do, that every place is important so I did not want good 
design to be limited to special places.  This was the approach of Clarke’s controls 
in the City and this therefore became the philosophy for everywhere.  It was only 
partially implemented following my departure and recent (2009) ‘reforms’ have, 
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along with the rest of Australia, tended to return to controls that assume 
everywhere should look the same as everywhere else, except for special 
‘character’ areas.  A typical elitist approach.   
 
Reformatting the SA planning controls 
 
At that time the SA legislation required the preparation of Regional Development 
Plans and then the implementation of Planning Regulations.  
 
The Development Plans were useful geography and regional policy documents 
with words that could be taken as generalized policies for the exercise of 
discretion in the control of development using interim development control.   
Once the Planning Regulations became law they applied with most developments 
being ‘as of right’.  If the controls required a discretion to be exercised third 
party appeals usually applied so developments strived to comply with the 
controls, even when, if a discretion was exercised a better design could be 
achieved.  I recall a large shopping centre proposal on the Main North Road 
where we tried to get the developer to put in a better design.  Everyone agreed it 
would be better for all concerned but, as it meant a few less car parks than the 
standard, it didn’t happen because the opposition centre would put in a TP 
appeal against the exercise of discretion and delay the opening.  
 
The Courts had difficulty in applying the generalized policies in the DPs.  I was 
not happy with the lack of design discretion in the regulations. I was also 
attracted to a single document format – similar to the City control document.   
 
The country model zoning regulations were dispensed with and we decided to 
work with councils to write place/parcel-formatted controls using DFCs as the 
objectives.   Also in the Metro areas.  Using the Norwood controls as a model, a 
team of staff were employed to rewrite the development plans into a single 
Development Plan for each council, put on a word processor and linked to the 
cadastral data base.  This ‘document’ contained the controls applying to each 
parcel. The 1984 legislation said that the only controls that applied were those in 
the DP.  This was a substantial improvement on traditional planning practice and 
is a credit to Stuart Hart with considerable assistance from Di Gayler who 
adopted and drove the approach.  (My only disagreement was with Stuart’s 
insistence that the 1984 Act contain a section requiring there to be ‘land use 
zones’.   This has led to a zoning layer in the controls, whereas any controls on 
use should appear under the Daces along with the other contextual controls.) 
 
For the approach of the legislation and other qualities, the SA planning system 
consistently has been judged the most efficient and effective in Australia.  
(Recent changes raise questions about its transparency.) 
 
Heritage Legislation  
 
I was determined to ensure that what became the Development Act should be 
the State’s development control system and that the tendency to set up separate 
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legislation for each reason for control should not happen.  To this end I ensured 
that, for example, the Coastal Authority legislation, which was just a repeat of the 
Planning legislation creating a regulatory overlay for a bit of the State, was 
integrated into the Planning legislation.  The Coastal Commission became a 
referral authority. 
 
When Rob Dempsey became head of the Department of Environment he clearly 
decided to demonstrate to his staff that he could deliver the goods.   He proposed 
Heritage legislation which would have seen a heritage list of places with control 
over them being given to a Heritage Council attached to his department.   
 
This was at a time when Area Managers were working closely with councils to 
accept that the whole of their areas were important and that country towns in 
particular should retain and enhance the qualities of their towns.  I could not 
have Heritage come in and take the control of the key buildings to Adelaide by a 
separate control process.  The local councilors would have been convinced that 
the rest didn’t matter.  This is the problem of listing.  
 
Dempsey had a Cabinet submission doing the rounds.  One day when Hudson 
was away interstate he put it into Cabinet on short notice.  With Deputy Premier 
Corcoran as his minister I knew I would lose so I did the improper thing and 
dropped a note to Dunstan telling him that our efforts to simplify the 
development regulatory system would be undone if we started to go down this 
path.  Don got Cabinet to postpone the decision and I was ordered to negotiate 
with Dempsey.  There was a very heated discussion chaired by Andrew 
Strickland and in the end the Heritage Council became a referral authority.  (It 
should be noted that in the recent (2011) Productivity Commission Report on 
planning systems, SA is singled out as the only State where the Development Act 
contains all the referral bodies as against, for example, the over 100 other bits of 
legislation in NSW that contain referrals.) 
 
Don resigned shortly after this event – no connection – and I remained on 




I was aware that Don was not well but his resignation came as a shock.  The night 
of the news Hudson told me that he may become Premier and that I should be 
ready to move to Premiers. The next morning that changed and Corcoran became 
Premier. Wrong choice. Interestingly Dempsey did not go with Corcoran into 
Premiers.  
 
Hugh was moved on and Don Hopgood (nice man) became Planning Minister, I 
suspect with instructions to get me under control.  (I recall briefing him and 
telling him how proud we were at getting rid of some non-rationalist rort, I think 
the tie of cheap loans to new houses, and he said, ‘Getting that increased was one 
of my great achievements.’)  
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When the Labor Government fell I gave the incoming Minister my resignation.  At 
that time I felt strongly that governments should be able to appoint their own 
people as heads of departments – I was critical of Whitlam not doing so 
immediately with the Prime Ministers Department position.  But I also thought 
that those political appointees should resign on a change of government and I 
had been openly critical of a couple of colleagues that had stayed on in Canberra 
after the Dismissal on extended leave.  
 
Before I went I urged Ron Barnes, the head of Treasury, to take over the 
development programming staff and information, as it would provide an 
excellent tool for budgeting purposes.  I was concerned that those that came 
after might revert to typical planners practice and this excellent work would be 
lost.  I don’t think Ron understood its usefulness.  State Treasuries generally do 
not see themselves as long-term strategic planners.  Nor do most planning 
departments unfortunately.  Within a few years the planning department 
reverted to type and it remains essentially a statutory planning rather than an 
urban management agency.  
 
A couple of years later when Hopgood was again a Minister he rang me to make 
sure that I would not make a fuss if Seaford were developed.  Being owned by the 
Trust and Land Com, and in his electorate I am sure the decision was about 
something other than good strategic planning. Once the Onkapringa River was 
crossed there was no southern boundary.  
 
I, of course, said it was a wrong decision but agreed to say nothing.  It was 
shortsighted, like recent proposals to further develop south and in the Hills.   
Developer and housing industry pressures have won. The Southern Vales and the 
Hills are assets too important to be frittered away on sprawl that can be 
accommodated in less valuable and scarce environments.  
